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The 1997/98 Asian currency crisis has led a once high-flying East Asia to realize its vulnerability 
to external shocks. This realization has given strong impetus to greater economic integration 
among East Asian economies, with the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA) a case in point. 
This paper qualitatively and quantitatively examines the economic feasibility of AKFTA: 
qualitatively using the theory of economic integration, and quantitatively by applying a CGE 
model. Our two-dimensional analysis provides some, but not overwhelming, support for 
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I. Introduction 
 
The Republic of Korea (Korea) and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have been integral to the miracle that has transformed East Asia from a group of 
typically poor third world countries into the world’s most dynamic economies. More precisely, 
Korea and ASEAN’s Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have sustained rapid growth 
in the postwar era, alongside Hong Kong, China; Japan, and Taipei,China to put East Asia on 
the world map as an economic powerhouse. Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and 
Taipei,China are newly industrialized economies, while Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have 
transformed themselves from stagnant agricultural economies into dynamic manufacturers. 
These eight “miracle” economies share a number of elements, including sound macroeconomic 
policies, high savings and investment rates, and heavy investment in education. Above all, the 
remarkable success of these countries has been based on export-oriented industrialization and 
is a powerful tribute to the potential benefits of globalization.  
 
But that same globalization turned against these countries with a vengeance in the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis. The massive capital inflows that had helped fuel rapid economic growth 
wreaked financial havoc as foreign investors suddenly lost confidence, beginning with 
Thailand’s forced baht devaluation in May 1997. Turmoil in the financial markets soon spread to 
the real economy and saw output contract sharply. Passionate debate rages about the causes 
of the crisis, but it is likely that a combination of external and internal factors played a role. What 
is beyond doubt is that the crisis was a painfully clear reminder that globalization holds 
opportunities as well as risks. Furthermore, there has been an unmistakable loss of momentum 
and self-confidence among many of these once high-flying economies. 
 
There is a widespread perception throughout the region that external forces, such as investors 
from the United States (US) and Europe, were largely responsible for the Asian crisis. 
Regardless of their accuracy, such perceptions gave rise to a region-wide sense of vulnerability 
to and suspicion of external forces, which, in turn, fostered a greater sense of regional identity 
and gave a strong impetus to regional economic integration.
1  In the immediate aftermath of the 
Asian crisis, the focus of economic regionalism lay in promoting regional financial cooperation, 
best exemplified by the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) among the ten ASEAN countries, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and Korea. The focus of regionalism has more 
recently been shifting toward the expansion of intra-regional trade. The region’s governments 
increasingly view intra-regional trade and domestic demand as a means of reducing their heavy 
dependence on extra-regional trade. 
 
The ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA)
2 is a concrete example of the active promotion of 
intra-regional trade. In May 2006 the two sides signed a free trade agreement that would lead to 
a free trade area by 2016. (Thailand did not sign due to the exclusion of rice from the 
agreement.) Greater economic cooperation between the two—with Korea the world’s eleventh 
largest economy and ASEAN collectively a substantial economic presence—can yield 
                                                 
1  Asian Development Bank (2005, 2008), Ahn, Baldwin and Cheong (2005), Moon and Andreosso-O’Callaghan (2005),  Harvie, 
Kimura and Lee (2005), Lee and Park (2005), Park (2006),  and Lincoln (2004) provide overviews of East Asian economic 
regionalism in the post-crisis period. 
2  For more detailed information about the “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Among the 
Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Republic of Korea,” 
visit http://www.aseansec.org/18063.htm (ASEAN site) and http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/econtrade/fta/issues/  index.jsp 
(Korea site).  For recent developments related to the ASEAN-Korea FTA, visit http://www.bilaterals.org/rubrique. 
php3?id_rubrique=142. 
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significant benefits for both sides. And Korea and ASEAN face many common challenges in the 
post-crisis period—such as growing competition from the PRC for manufactured exports and 
foreign direct investment—that strengthen the case for economic integration. 
 
While economic integration refers to the removal of barriers to the cross-border flows of goods, 
services, capital, and labor, economic integration between ASEAN and Korea realistically 
means only more trade between the two sides before they can contemplate moving toward 
deeper levels of integration. The central objective of our paper is to examine the extent to which 
economic criteria favor AKFTA’s prospects. That is, our central question is whether AKFTA is an 
optimal free trade area in the sense that it is likely to be mutually beneficial for ASEAN and 
Korea from a purely economic viewpoint. To address this question we use qualitative analysis 
based on the theory of economic integration pioneered by Viner (1950), which tells us whether 
theoretical criteria favor AKFTA, and quantitative analysis using the CGE model, providing us 
with quantitative estimates of the impact of AKFTA. 
 
In Section II, we review the theory of economic integration. In Section III, we explore the issue of 
whether AKFTA would be beneficial for ASEAN and Korea through the prism of this theory. In 
Section IV, we present a CGE model and its quantitative estimates of AKFTA’s trade and 
welfare impact. And in Section V, we summarize our key findings. 
 
 
II.  Theory of Economic Integration 
 
The theory of economic integration is anchored in the theory of customs union, formally 
developed by Viner (1950). The key feature of regional economic integration is that the 
component economies of a region or trading bloc agree to undertake a progressive removal of 
barriers to free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Reduction or removal of tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers will obviously lead to economic integration within the region by facilitating 
the flow of goods. For example, in the European Union (EU) the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
established, in principle, free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor in Western 
Europe. The EU probably represents the most advanced form of international integration in the 
world today.
3 More generally, there are six types of economic integration.  
 
•  Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) is the most basic form of economic integration.  It 
imposes lower tariffs on imports from member countries than from third countries.  
•  A Free Trade Area is an agreement among countries under which tariffs and non-
tariffs barriers (NTBs) such as quotas, licensing, and product safety regulations are 
abolished among members. However, each member retains its external tariffs and 
other regulations for trade with non-member countries. AKFTA is essentially a free 
trade area in progress. 
•  In a customs union, member states abolish all tariffs and quantitative restrictions on 
trade among member states. At the same time, they impose a common set of tariffs 
for trade with non-member states. 
                                                 
3  See Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006), De Lombaerde (2006), El-Agraa (1999), Jovanovic (2005, 2006), and Robson (2006) for 
overviews of economic integration theory 
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•  A common market involves a customs union as well as free movement of factors of 
production such as capital and labor. The EU has been a common market since the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
•  In an economic union among countries, in addition to a common market, there is also 
harmonization of fiscal, monetary, industrial, and other economic policies. An example 
is the monetary union which came into existence on 1 January 1999 among eleven 
members of the EU. 
•  The highest degree of economic integration is a supranational union. Member 
governments hand over their sovereignty for economic and social policies to a 
supranational government. A supranational union is unlikely since nations are 
generally reluctant to surrender their sovereignty. 
 
In the context of AKFTA, economic integration realistically means the expansion of trade 
between ASEAN and Korea. Removing all barriers to the movement of goods and services, 
capital and labor between Korea and the ten ASEAN states is at best a long-run goal. 
Substantial and concrete progress has already been made so far. In 2006–2007, ASEAN and 
Korea signed free trade agreements on goods and services, including a dispute settlement 
accord. In the early part of 2008, both parties agreed to complete the negotiations on the 
investment accord within the year. If the implementation of the free trade agreements turns out 
successfully, then perhaps ASEAN and Korea can, at a later stage, contemplate moving toward 
more advanced stages of integration. 
 
A.  Theory of Customs Union 
 
  Under a customs union, member-economies of a region agree to phase-out tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions on imports from the region, and impose a set of common external tariffs 
on imports from non-member countries. What distinguishes a customs union from a free trade 
area is that in the former there are common external tariffs against non-members as well as free 
trade, whereas in the latter, each member retains its own tariffs against non-members. It is thus 
possible to view a free trade area as a variant of the customs union or vice versa.  
 
Theoretically, a customs union entails both positive and negative welfare effects. The positive 
effect, referred to as trade creation, arises from the replacement of higher cost domestic 
products with lower cost imports from member countries. The change from an expensive to a 
cheaper source of supply is beneficial because it is a move toward freer trade. For example, in 
the case of AKFTA, Malaysia may be better off importing automobiles from Korea instead of 
producing them locally. In turn, Korea may be better off importing some electronic components 
from Malaysia rather than producing them locally.  
 
The negative effect, trade diversion, occurs when a member-country replaces low cost imports 
from non-members with higher cost imports from member nations. This diversion occurs 
because non-members face higher tariffs than members of the customs union. Trade diversion 
has a negative effect on welfare since it implies greater access to a more costly source of 
supply. In this sense, it is a move toward protectionism and away from free trade. For example, 
in the case of an ASEAN-Korea customs union, Korea may be worse off by importing some 
primary commodities from Indonesia rather than Australia. 
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The net gain of customs union depends on which effect is larger. If trade creation outweighs 
trade diversion, then the net effect of the customs union on welfare will be positive. However, if 
trade diversion outweighs trade creation, customs union could do more harm than good. 
 
B. Static  Factors 
 
  As we have just seen, whether a customs union is beneficial depends on whether the 
magnitude of trade creation is greater or less than trade diversion. In answering this critical 
question, it is important to consider both static and dynamic factors. Static factors are important 
considerations in evaluating the one-off change in welfare arising from the formation of a 
customs union. Among these factors are the size of the free trade area (FTA), geographical 
proximity of member-economies, levels of economic development of member-economies, and 
complementarity of economic structures among member economies. In addition, factors related 
to external trade, including tariff structures of member economies prior to customs union, are 
important considerations. Finally, it is crucial to look at the substitutability between products of 
member states and products of non-member states in determining whether a customs union will 
be beneficial or not.  
 
C. Dynamic  Factors 
 
In contrast to static factors, dynamic factors do not pertain to one-off changes in welfare but 
gradually emerge over time. For example, we can expect firms and industries of a country more 
exposed to competition from its neighbors after the formation of a customs union to become 
more efficient. But those efficiency gains will not be realized overnight. The main dynamic 
benefits are improvements in efficiency due to greater competition and gains from greater 
specialization, economies of scale, and learning-by-doing. Other dynamic benefits include 
reduction in intra-regional transactions costs, some protection from adverse developments in 
world markets, and bargaining power vis-à-vis industrialized countries. 
 
Against these potential dynamic benefits, we must also consider the dynamic cost of 
polarization. Integration among countries with different levels of income and economic 
development could lead to an unequal distribution of gains. Any perception that the benefits or 
costs of integration are disproportionately falling upon a country or a subset of countries is likely 
to produce a backlash which will threaten the viability of the union over time. 
 
D. Non-Economic  Factors 
 
Besides the largely economic criteria discussed in previous sections, a large number of non-
economic factors determine the success or failure of economic integration. The experience of 
the EU highlights the central role of such non-economic variables in economic integration. Some 
examples are a common desire to put an end to violent conflicts, a shared feeling of 
vulnerability, and political leaders who realize there are common problems which require 
common solutions. By far the most important non-economic variable is political leadership 
seriously committed to integration and cooperation. The political commitment of the 
governments of both ASEAN and Korea to AKFTA is a pre-condition for the success of AKFTA. 
The political commitment, in turn, depends to a large extent on whether it is in the geopolitical 
self-interest of both sides to strengthen their overall relationship. AKFTA is a key channel for 
strengthening this relationship between ASEAN and Korea. 
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III.  Prospects of AKFTA 
 
In this section, we examine whether the theoretical considerations discussed in the preceding 
section favor the success of AKFTA. Economic integration between ASEAN and Korea at this 
stage essentially means more trade between the two sides. ASEAN-Korea trade currently 
occurs primarily between Korea and ASEAN’s richer inner core—Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei Darussalam. But Korea’s trade with its poorer 
periphery—Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,(Lao PDR) Myanmar, and Viet 
Nam—is also growing rapidly. 
  
A. Static  Economic  Factors 
 
Here we look at the various static factors that impinge on AKFTA’s ability to become an effective 
mechanism for promoting mutually beneficial trade between ASEAN and Korea. We have 
already examined the criteria which theoretically support the creation of a customs union and 
now apply those criteria to AKFTA to evaluate its prospects for success. 
 
1.  Size of FTA 
 
Trade creation is positively related to the economic size of the FTA, that is, the larger the 
economic size, the larger the potential trade creation. While AKFTA is much smaller in 
economic weight than NAFTA or the EU, it is by no means an economic lightweight. The 11 
countries of AKFTA together had gross national income (GNI) of around $1.84 trillion in 2006. In 
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, AKFTA’s GNI was about $3.38 trillion, with Korea’s at 
about $1.11 trillion and ASEAN’s at $2.26 trillion. And the region is home to about 605 million 
people. These two factors indicate substantial potential for trade creation. 
 
2. Pre-FTA  Tariff  Structure 
 
Despite a general trend toward trade liberalization in Korea and ASEAN—especially the WTO 
members of the ASEAN inner core—under the multilateral WTO system, tariffs and non-tariff 
trade barriers between the two sides remain high enough to create significant opportunities for 
trade creation. For example, for political reasons, Korea has relatively high tariff rates against 
agricultural goods, which are a major export of Thailand and Viet Nam. Likewise, ASEAN 
countries that have sizable automobile industries, such as Thailand and Malaysia, have 
relatively high tariff rates against automobiles, a major Korean export.  
 
The level and variance of tariffs against non-members also suggests some scope for trade 
diversion. According to WTO (2005), the simple average ad valorem tariff rate of Korea (11.2%) 
was higher than the rates in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, which ranged 
from 0.0% to 8.4%. Among the more advanced ASEAN countries, only Thailand had a higher 
average tariff rate (15.4%) than Korea. For nonagricultural goods, Korea’s average tariff rate 
was 9.5%, almost twice the average for the five ASEAN countries above. Tariffs of agricultural 
goods had a higher variance—the average tariff rate for Korea was 41.6% while average tariff 
rates in the five ASEAN countries ranged from 0.0% to 29.6%. There also existed a wide 
variability in the tariff rates of the ASEAN countries and Korea for different specific product 
categories. Therefore, the structure of AKFTA’s tariffs against outsiders does not rule out 
significant trade diversion.  
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3.  Intra-FTA Trade Prior to AKFTA 
 
The trade creation effect is stronger the greater the size of pre-FTA trade. The underlying 
intuition is simple: countries that trade heavily with each other stand to gain the most from 
eliminating impediments to trade. By the same token, removing trade impediments will no longer 
matter to those who trade little with each other. ASEAN and Korea are already important export 
and import markets for each other. In 2006, ASEAN’s exports to and imports from Korea 
reached $27.2 billion and $29 billion, respectively. ASEAN has become Korea’s fifth largest 
trading partner and vice versa. Korea’s exports to and imports from ASEAN accounted for 
around 9.8% of the country’s total exports and 9.6% of its total imports in the same period. 
ASEAN-Korea trade has grown rapidly in recent years, rising from $38.3 billion in 2000 to $56.2 
billion in 2006. 
 
Although Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore capture about 70% of ASEAN’s trade with Korea, 
other ASEAN economies have also become increasingly important. For Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
and Viet Nam, trade with Korea expanded around 10–30% between 2000 and 2006.  The level 
and growth of trade between ASEAN and Korea is such that the removal of trade barriers will 
yield substantial benefits. 
 
4. Substitutability  of  Products 
 
Substitutability of products of member states for those of non-member states increases the 
chances of trade creation. Substitutability refers to the production of similar but differentiated 
products. For example, Malaysia can theoretically substitute semi-conductors from Taipei,China 
with similar but slightly different semi-conductors from Korea. While ASEAN’s trade with Korea 
is large and growing, most of ASEAN’s exports go to other markets and most of its imports 
come from other markets. ASEAN’s biggest trading partners are also Korea’s biggest trading 
partners, namely, the PRC, EU, Japan, and the US. Such a trade pattern provides stylized 
evidence of the limited substitutability of products. The extent to which Korea and ASEAN can 
substitute imports from external markets with imports from each other is likely to be limited. 
 
5.  Disparity in Pre-FTA Level of Development 
 
If pre–FTA income levels are similar among members, integration will be more beneficial. A 
major reason for the EU’s success is that all its countries are developed market economies with 
relatively small disparities in income levels and other structural characteristics. In AKFTA, 
Korean per capita income is significantly ahead of the ASEAN countries. Korea’s 2006 per 
capita GNI was $17,690 compared with ASEAN’s $1,881 (excluding Brunei and Singapore). In 
purchasing power parity terms, Korea’s 2006 per capita GNI was $22,990 and ASEAN’s $4,563, 
making Korea about five times richer. Only the city-state of Singapore and the small, oil-based 
economy of Brunei have higher per capita incomes than Korea. Income levels in ASEAN and 
Korea do not seem to be similar enough to provide potential for extensive intra-industry trade. 
 
6.  Geographical Proximity and Transportation Infrastructure 
 
Geographical proximity, along with good land, sea and air links, is important for economic 
integration. ASEAN and Korea are separated by the PRC and it takes six hours to fly between 
Seoul, the Korean capital, and Singapore, ASEAN’s commercial hub. Nevertheless, ASEAN and 
Korea are much closer to each other than some of their other major trading partners, especially 
the US and the EU. Air and sea links are especially relevant to ASEAN-Korea trade given the 
absence of direct land links. There are frequent and expanding commercial flights linking   8
ASEAN and Korea and extensive commercial shipping activity between ASEAN (Singapore in 
particular) and major Korean ports, such as Pusan. All in all, some geographical distance 
separates ASEAN and Korea, but relatively good and improving air and sea links place the two 
in a strong position to efficiently increase bilateral trade under AKFTA. 
 
7.  Complementary or Competitive Economic Structures 
 
 Whether the members’ economic structures are complementary or competitive influences the 
success or failure of a free trade area. The insights of Meade (1955) suggest that the trade 
creation effect will be stronger if pre-FTA economic structures are competitive but post-FTA 
economic structures are complementary. High tariffs and non-tariff barriers may induce FTA 
members to produce similar goods before the FTA. Afterward, more efficient producers replace 
less efficient ones and the number of similar goods produced falls, resulting in welfare gains 
associated with specialization and economies of scale. That is, the removal of trade barriers 
within an FTA allows member countries to take better advantage of their comparative advantage. 
Korea and the ASEAN economies are competitive to some extent now,  but trade barriers are 
high enough to protect inefficient domestic producers from effective competition in selected 
high-priority sectors such as Korea’s agriculture and certain manufacturing sectors in ASEAN. 
The more significant question is whether ASEAN and Korea will become complementary after 
AKFTA so that they produce less similar goods than before the FTA, but the answer to this is 
unclear. Although the rapid growth of ASEAN-Korean trade in recent years does provide some 
indirect evidence of potential complementarities (See Kwon 2004), such evidence is far from 
conclusive.  
 
B. Dynamic  Economic  Factors 
 
Although static benefits are an important motivation for economic integration, potentially large 
dynamic benefits provide an additional impetus. In particular, greater competition and improved 
efficiency arising from AKFTA will create positive welfare gains for both Korea and ASEAN. 
  
As a consequence of globalization, both these regions face the challenge of the emergence of 
and competition from the PRC and India. Fostering greater competition through deeper and 
broader integration with each other can be highly useful in promoting productivity and efficiency, 
a pre-condition for success in an increasingly competitive global economy.  
 
In fact, dynamic economic considerations seem to be a powerful underlying motivation behind 
the AKFTA initiative. While ASEAN and Korea have suffered an unmistakable loss of self-
confidence and momentum in the post-Asian crisis period, ASEAN faces a much more urgent 
need to sharpen its international competitiveness. That’s because Korea is still substantially 
ahead of the PRC and India in its position in the manufacturing value chain and therefore less 
vulnerable to competition from the two emerging giants. By contrast, the technology and skill 
gap between ASEAN and the PRC and India is much smaller, leaving ASEAN more vulnerable. 
Although exports and economic growth are not a zero-sum game, and, indeed, ASEAN is 
benefiting from large and growing exports to the PRC and India, there is little doubt that the 
emergence of the two giants poses long-run challenges to ASEAN.  ASEAN economies can 
compete effectively in the global marketplace only by significantly improving productivity and 
efficiency. As for Korea, even though it is less exposed to competition from the PRC and India 
than ASEAN, it will also benefit from greater competition with ASEAN in those industries in 
which both economies are significant producers. Korea’s active post-crisis pursuit of bilateral 
free trade agreements, including AKFTA, reflects to some extent a realization among 
policymakers and the general public of the need to improve the economy’s adaptability and   9
flexibility in light of intensifying global competition. The formation of AKFTA may also increase 
the foreign direct investment (FDI) into the ASEAN economies and Korea by creating a larger 
common market from the perspective of outside investors. Foreign multinational companies 
(MNCs) locating in ASEAN will find it easier to export to Korea, and MNCs in Korea to export to 
ASEAN.  
 
C. Non-Economic  Factors   
 
While economic factors are clearly a powerful rationale for economic integration, we cannot 
ignore the importance of non-economic factors. The political commitment, will, and leadership of 
governments, by facilitating close cooperation among governments, are critical pre-conditions 
for a successful FTA. While many outside observers have often criticized ASEAN for being 
excessively consensual and hence largely ineffective, the group has in fact been remarkably 
successful in promoting political cooperation among member governments. Therefore, to a large 
extent, ASEAN countries have been able to speak with a single voice in negotiations with Korea 
over the formation of AKFTA. As noted earlier, Thailand is a significant exception in this regard 
due to its objections to the exclusion of rice from the agreement. In addition, there seems to be 
an ASEAN-wide consensus about the desirability and feasibility of AKFTA. 
 
The political commitment of ASEAN and Korean governments to AKFTA is further reinforced by 
fundamental economic considerations. For ASEAN, AKFTA is a mechanism for benefiting from 
closer economic interaction with the world’s eleventh biggest economy, a significantly richer and 
technologically more advanced country.  This includes not only the opportunity to expand 
exports into a big market but also to attract capital and technology from Korean companies. For 
Korea, AKFTA is a means to expand trade with an economically significant region which is 
already a major trading partner. As such, AKFTA can help diversify both export and import 
markets, and reduce the country’s reliance on trade with the PRC and the US. 
 
 
IV.  Quantitative Analysis Using the CGE Model 
 
In our qualitative analysis of static factors, we have noted that several factors, such as pre-FTA 
size, initial trade, and tariff barriers appear to bode well for the economic integration of ASEAN 
and Korea. At the same time, other factors such as pre-FTA level of development and limited 
substitutability of products between what ASEAN exports (imports) and what Korea imports 
(exports) may work against the success of AKFTA. This means that, depending on the 
importance of each factor, it is not clear whether a free trade area between Korea and ASEAN 
will be beneficial for its member-countries.  
 
Several studies have investigated the impact of AKFTA using CGE models. These have mostly 
relied on the model and data base of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) and differ 
mainly in their assumptions. For the most part, these studies look at all the proliferating 
proposals for free trade agreements in East Asia rather than only AKFTA, and compare the 
welfare implications of various alternative scenarios of FTAs. While these studies tend to show 
AKFTA’s impact on Korea, they do not always show its effect on individual ASEAN countries. 
 
A common finding across several CGE-based studies is that AKFTA can benefit the ASEAN 
region as a whole. However, they are divided in terms of (1) the impact on Korea, (2) which 
countries are likely to benefit the most, or (3) whether Korea or ASEAN is likely to gain more 
from AKFTA. A study by Choi, Park, and Lee (2003) indicates that both Korea and ASEAN will 
experience welfare gains, but Korea will gain more than ASEAN. In contrast, simulations by   10
Cheong (2003) show that ASEAN will benefit but Korea is likely to suffer welfare and output 
losses. Ando and Urata (2006) incorporate trade liberalization, capital accumulation, and trade 
facilitation into their model, and found that individual ASEAN countries, in particular Thailand 
and Singapore, will benefit from AKFTA. 
 
More recent studies based on CGE modeling takes into account countries’ commitments to 
trade agreements as well as expected trade liberalizations over several years. Kawai and 
Wignaraja (2008) found that AKFTA generated positive income effects for Korea and individual 
ASEAN countries relative to their baseline scenario. Based on deviations in equivalent 
variations, the highest gains accrued to Viet Nam, Korea and Thailand while the lowest gains 
accrued to the CLM countries. Lee and van der Mensbrugghe (2007) examined AKFTA’s 
welfare effects relative to a baseline scenario of no FTAs over the period 2001-2015. They 
found that AKFTA raised the welfare of Korea and ASEAN as a whole, but did not analyze the 
welfare effects for individual ASEAN countries. 
 
Having reviewed the existing quantitative studies of AKFTA, we are now ready to perform our 
own quantitative analysis of AKFTA. More precisely, we apply the CGE model to quantify the 
gains and losses for the entire free trade area as well as individual countries. Information on 
individual country impact is particularly relevant for AKFTA, since the free trade area 
encompasses a great deal of heterogeneity in income and development levels.   
 
A. Model  and  Data 
 
The CGE model used in this section is the “GTAP6inGAMS” model developed by Rutherford 
(2005). The model has three economic agents: producer, representative consumer consisting of 
both private household and government, and trading partners. The GTAP6inGAMS model is a 
traditional static Arrow-Debreu type of general equilibrium model in which the zero profit 
condition and market clearance define the equilibrium. The GTAP6inGAMS is a modified 
version of the GTAP model version 6 developed for GAMS users.
4 
 
We use the GTAP 6 database, which provides global production and trade data for 89 
countries/regions and 55 sectors. For simplicity, we aggregate sectors into 7 general industries 
(See Table 1). We measure trade, output and welfare effects for (1) the free trade area as a 
whole and (2) individual member countries, except Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, which 
we aggregate into a single economy and refer to as CLM.
5 Our simulations assume 2001 to be 
the base year using the GTAP Version 6.




In order to quantitatively measure the effects of the AKFTA on welfare, output production, and 
trade flows for member economies, we assume that both import tariffs and export taxes 




                                                 
4  The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) is providing both a multi-region and multi-sector CGE model and a global economic 
dataset for use in the quantitative analyses of international economic issues. For the GTAP, visit 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu. For the GAMS (Generalized Algebraic Modeling System), visit http://www.gams.com. 
5  Owing to data limitations, we also exclude Brunei Darussalam.  
6  See Dimaranan and McDougall (2006). 
7  MPSGE (Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium analysis) is  a subsystem within GAMS.  See 
http://www.gams.com/solvers/mpsge/index.htm.   11





Paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains not elsewhere classified (nec), vegetables, fruit, nuts, oil 
seeds, sugar cane, sugar beet, plant-based fibers, crops nec, cattle, sheep and goats, 
horses, animal products, raw milk, wool, silk-worm cocoons,  
 
Food Products   Meat products nec, vegetable oils and fats, dairy products, processed rice, sugar, food 
products nec, beverages and tobacco products 
 
Extractive Industry   Forestry, fishing, coal, oil, gas, minerals nec, petroleum, coal products 
 
Light Manufacturing   Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products, wood products 
 
Heavy Manufacturing   Paper products, publishing, chemical, rubber, plastic products, mineral products nec, 




Metal products, motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment nec, electronic equipment, 
machinery and equipment nec, manufactures nec 
 
Services  Electricity, gas manufacture, distribution, water, construction trade, transport, financial, 





B. Empirical  Results 
 
Results of the simulations indicate that for the free trade area and most member-countries, the 
creation of an AKFTA will bring about welfare and output gains, that is, the benefits from 
integration will outweigh the losses. In addition, since trade diversion is smaller than trade 
creation, net trade creation is positive. However, gains are unevenly distributed, with a few 
countries gaining more than the others. In addition, while some economic sectors are likely to 
grow, other sectors are likely to contract. While it is important that net welfare effects for the 
whole region be positive, it is also crucial to consider the distribution of net benefits across 
countries, in particular whether richer economies benefit more than poorer economies. On the 
other hand, for an individual country, an important issue is the distribution of net benefits across 
industries. It matters whether or not the FTA’s impact falls primarily on industries of high 
significance for the national economy.  
 
C. Trade  Effects 
 
Figure 1 illustrates trade creation and diversion effects, which are computed as percentage 
deviations from the base value of trade volumes with members and nonmembers, respectively. 
Positive trade creation means expansion of trade within the free trade area, while negative trade 
diversion means reduction of trade with nonmembers. For the free trade area as a whole, trade 
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As expected, AKFTA will accelerate trade between ASEAN and Korea. Indonesia and Malaysia 
will account for about half of the growth in trade between ASEAN and Korea. AKFTA will shift 
the trade balance in favor of ASEAN, whose exports to Korea will rise by 20% and imports from 
Korea will fall by 3%. ASEAN countries’ bilateral trade balance with Korea will improve. More 
specifically; (i) Indonesia, Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, the CLM countries will see an 
increase in the trade surplus;  (ii) Thailand will see a shift from a negative to a positive trade 
balance; and (iii) Philippines, Singapore, and Viet Nam will see a decrease in the trade deficit 
(see Figure 2). As a result, ASEAN’s total trade balance with Korea will shift from negative prior 
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We now explore the impact of AKFTA on the trade of less developed ASEAN member-countries. 
Four points are worth noting: first, Viet Nam and CLM will account for less than 10% of 
ASEAN’s growth in trade with Korea.  Second, while Korea’s trade with Viet Nam will expand by 
only 2%, its trade with CLM will grow by no less than 18%. CLM-Korea trade will thus become 
the fastest-growing component of ASEAN-Korea trade. Third, CLM’s trade surplus with Korea 
will increase and Viet Nam’s trade deficit with Korea will decrease. Finally, along with Thailand, 
CLM and Viet Nam will experience the highest net trade creation among all member-countries. 
This is because they benefit from relatively high trade creation and suffer little trade diversion. 
Overall, AKFTA seems to have a favorable impact on the trade of ASEAN’s poorer countries.  
 
D.  Welfare and Output Effects 
 
The formation of AKFTA will increase aggregate welfare (0.4%) and raise real GDP (0.9%). 
ASEAN as a group will experience positive welfare and output gains.  We can divide AKFTA 
into three groups based on welfare effects: (i) Malaysia and Singapore will enjoy relatively high 
welfare gains of 2–5%; (ii) Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam will experience 
modest gains of less than 2%, and (iii) CLM and Korea will suffer welfare losses (see Figure 3). 
Broadly speaking, real output effects more or less correspond to welfare effects so that 
countries which gain the most in welfare also tend to gain the most in real output. What is 
interesting and troubling is that the CLM countries will suffer net welfare and output losses 
despite net trade gains. Output losses can be partly traced to total imports rising faster than total 
exports. Although CLM’s exports will rise by 11.2% under AKFTA, this will be more than offset 
by an 11.8% rise in imports (see Figure 4).   14
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Unlike CLM, Viet Nam will enjoy welfare and output gains under AKFTA. In fact, Viet Nam’s 
output gains will be greater than those of higher income countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, 
or Philippines. This is mainly because Viet Nam’s total exports will grow rapidly, by 15.4%, the 
fastest among member-economies. Viet Nam’s total export growth will be much higher than its 
total import growth. 
 
Looking at the sectoral impacts in Table 2, the real output of all sectors listed in Table 1 will 
contract in CLM countries, except in two sectors:  the extractive industry and light manufacturing. 
The real output of agricultural products and food products will contract by 2.7% and 4.1%, 
respectively. Since agriculture is a key sector in these countries in both output and employment, 
a marked decline in real agricultural output would have large repercussions for their fragile 
economies. This helps explain why CLM countries are likely to suffer a decline in real welfare 
and output under AKFTA. Viet Nam, however, will not suffer a similar fate, despite the 
contraction of its agricultural and food products sectors, as high growth in its manufacturing 
sector more than compensates those losses. While we have not quantified the dynamic gains 
here, a source of optimism for CLM is that dynamic gains may exceed static losses. This is not 
unlikely since growing trade with advanced member-countries within the region can deliver 
potentially large productivity gains for poorer countries over time. 
 
 
Table 2: Sectoral Real Output Impacts of AKFTA (% Deviations from the Base) 
 
















Indonesia 0.14  1.73  3.54  0.26  -0.06  0.21  1.24  0.94 
Malaysia 3.72  -10.16  19.63  0.49  7.29 -0.05  -0.94  0.00 
Philippines -0.12  3.96  0.20  0.87  -1.25  1.34  1.10  1.01 
Singapore 8.43  0.34  51.87  7.13  4.05  4.94  -0.82  0.93 
Thailand 0.36  7.49  -1.77  0.21  -0.20 3.88  2.99  0.77 
Viet Nam  2.88  -0.43  -0.09  -0.97  7.64  0.85  10.99  -0.38 
CLM -0.06  -2.69  -4.06  1.04  1.41  -1.62  -3.25 -1.30 
Korea, 
Rep. of  -0.01 -0.66  -1.07 -0.09  -0.19  0.19  0.11  -0.14 
 
CLM = Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar.  
 
Korea will suffer net welfare and output losses from a free trade area with ASEAN.  Out of the 
seven sectors considered in this paper, all but two manufacturing sectors will contract. However, 
being left out of the general trend toward ASEAN+1 free trade agreements may bring about 
substantial dynamic losses for Korea, which competes against China and Japan. Since our 
analysis suggests that Korea is unlikely to experience positive static trade, welfare or output net 
gains, dynamic gains or non-economic factors are likely to be Korea’s main underlying 
motivation for pursuing AKFTA. This reinforces the point made in Section 3 that dynamic 
economic considerations appeared to be a key impetus behind the AKFTA, especially from the 
point of view of Korea. More specifically, Korea is expecting the relatively fast-growing ASEAN 
region to grow in importance as an export market over time. Securing a stable and   16
geographically close supply of mineral and energy resources would be another important long-
run motive for Korea. Finally, ASEAN will continue to be a major destination for Korea’s large 
and growing FDI outflows, especially for firms which seek geographical diversification of their 
production. 
 
Dynamic considerations are likewise important for ASEAN. In addition to productivity gains from 
greater competition, transfer of technology through trade – e.g. imports of capital goods – can 
benefit ASEAN, which lags substantially behind Korea in terms of technological capabilities. 
This is especially true for the CLM countries since not only will they experience the fastest 
growth in trade with Korea (see Figure 5) but their low technology levels imply a larger scope for 
improvement. Measures to promote technology diffusion will facilitate the transfer of technology 
from Korea to ASEAN.  
 
 


















V. Concluding  Remarks 
 
Korea and ASEAN, through sustained, rapid growth, have been part of the East Asian miracle 
that has transformed this group of once poor developing countries into the world’s most 
economically dynamic region. This miracle was based on export-oriented industrialization and 
provides compelling evidence of the enormous potential benefits of globalization. However, the 
Asian financial crisis which devastated the economies of ASEAN and Korea in 1997/1998 gave 
equally compelling evidence of the potential risks of globalization. The crisis gave rise to a new-
found sense of vulnerability to external forces and, in turn, to economic regionalism. Although 
the initial focus of post-crisis East Asian economic regionalism lay in promoting financial 
cooperation through the Chiang Mai Initiative, this has gradually shifted to expanding intra-
regional trade.  










The subject of our paper is the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA) initiative, a concrete 
example of East Asia’s effort to boost intra-regional trade in the post-crisis period. The two sides 
signed a free trade agreement in May 2006 to create a free trade area by 2016. Our central 
objective was to perform a qualitative and quantitative analysis to assess the feasibility and 
desirability of AKFTA. Our qualitative analysis, which used the theory of economic integration to 
critically examine whether purely economic static considerations are conducive for AKFTA, 
suggested that there are grounds for both optimism and pessimism. For example, the large and 
growing level of pre-FTA trade between ASEAN and Korea is a conducive factor, whereas the 
large income gap between Korea and ASEAN as a whole is an impediment.  
 
Our quantitative analysis, which is based on application of a CGE model, also suggests that 
AKFTA will entail both costs and benefits. The costs include AKFTA’s negative welfare and 
output effects on poorer member countries, especially CLM, while the benefits include positive 
net trade creation for the AKFTA region as a whole and for each member-country. 
 
Since AKFTA entails potential welfare losses, the creation of structural funds such as those 
implemented by the EU may be necessary. The case for structural funds is all the stronger for 
AKFTA since our analysis indicates that welfare losses will fall disproportionately on poor CLM. 
Structural funds can help to narrow the gap between poor and rich countries by providing 
support for infrastructure, technological improvement, and human capital development. They 
can also enhance transportation and communication linkages between member countries, and 
provide structural adjustment assistance for adversely affected industries. The EU experience 
offers useful lessons in terms of how the costs and benefits of structural funds can be shared 
without disrupting cohesion among member countries. 
 
Taking into account dynamic economic factors and non-economic factors provides grounds for 
optimism. ASEAN and Korea share the challenge of growing competition from the PRC and 
India, and, more generally, competing in an increasingly competitive global economy. As such, 
improving economic efficiency by exposing their firms and industries to greater foreign 
competition can bring significant benefits. AKFTA will thus improve the international 
competitiveness of ASEAN and Korea by promoting competition and efficiency. In addition, 
ASEAN and Korea share a desire for a multi-polar East Asia not dominated by Japan and the 
PRC, and this shared geopolitical objective provides a solid cornerstone for economic 
cooperation between the two sides, in particular through AKFTA.   18
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